Security model
Blender MCP is local-first. It assumes the MCP client and the Blender process run on the same trusted machine and that scene contents are not hostile.
Transport
- The bridge listens on IPv4
127.0.0.1on an ephemeral port. It opens no
external interface.
- Every request carries a random bearer token. Requests without it receive HTTP
403.
- The connection file contains the port, token and Blender pid. It is created
privately and the server refuses files owned by another user or readable by other users.
- A connection file whose pid is no longer alive is treated as offline and
removed.
A process that can read the connection file can issue bridge requests. Protect the file and use only trusted local clients.
Filesystem
- Saves, exports, previews, baked maps and generated assets must resolve inside
the configured workspace, including through symbolic links.
- Output files are reserved exclusively before Blender writes them. Existing
files are never overwritten.
- Imports must resolve inside the workspace. Sources are copied to a private
temporary file and their SHA-256 is checked before Blender reads them.
- Imported textures must be packed or resolve inside the workspace, depending on
the format.
- There is no arbitrary Python tool.
Mutations
- Every mutation requires a claimed edit lease tied to the current project
identity.
- A successful owned save or project transition updates the lease binding.
- Failed operations restore scene state where the feature supports rollback.
- A timeout is reported as an uncertain outcome. The server never retries a
mutation automatically.
Network and models
- The server makes no network requests.
- The optional image-to-3D worker runs offline with local weights.
- No telemetry is collected.
- No vendor presets, samples, artwork or product masters are included.
Reporting
Report vulnerabilities as described in SECURITY.md.